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Abstract 
This paper addresses the potential for so-called ‘double dividends’, a possibility still 
largely dismissed by economists and, consequently by policy-makers.  To come to grips 
with this question, the paper begins with a discussion of the notion of competitive 
equilibrium. This is followed by a discussion of the link between disequilibrium and 
innovation, and the non-linear dynamics of competition between technologies with 
increasing returns, resulting in path-dependence. Increasing returns to adoption permit 
‘lock-in’ of inferior technologies due to economies of scale and experience. However, in 
time, the initial advantage can be lost due to further innovation. This, in turn, is largely 
responsible for the existence of opportunities for ‘double dividends’. Double dividends 
can result when technological progress enables a technology that was originally ‘locked 
out’ to become competitive at a later time. The paper concludes with a detailed analysis 
of what is arguably the most important opportunity for double dividends in the US and 
world economy, namely overcoming the ‘lock-in’ of the monopoly electric power 
distribution system. This would encourage wider application of co-generation and/or 
decentralized combined heat and power (CHP) technology, with dramatic reductions in 
costs, carbon dioxide output and improved overall system reliability. 
 iv
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Disequilibrium, ‘lock-in’ and potential double dividends: The 
case of distributed combined heat and power (DCHP) 
Robert U. Ayres 
Competitive equilibrium: concept and reality 
The intellectual background for this paper begins with the idea of economic 
equilibrium. It goes back at least to Adam Smith's first articulation of the idea of an 
‘invisible hand’, which supposedly assures an efficient allocation of resources by 
‘beneficent providence’ through the operation of a price mechanism in free competitive 
markets. This seminal idea was refined by Ricardo, Say, Walras, Jevons, Edgeworth, 
Wicksell, Pareto and others in the 19th century. 
Walras postulated a unique competitive equilibrium, namely a set of prices such 
that supply would exactly balance demand in each market (i.e. for each good or 
service), including labor. Walras also postulated a kind of auction process, called 
tâtonnement, by means of which the equilibrium state would be reached spontaneously, 
assuming each market actor was always fully informed by a sort of super auctioneer 
about all transaction prices. Even though Walras was not able to prove this conjecture, it 
was widely accepted and had an enormous influence on subsequent developments in 
economic theory. 
It was recognized long ago that one of the keys to the existence of a stable 
competitive equilibrium is the universality of a property known as declining marginal 
utility of consumption for all consumers and declining marginal productivity of capital 
for all producers. The general acceptance of these properties became known as the 
“marginal revolution” in economics, dating back to Jevons and Walras c. 1870. It has 
enabled mathematicians to study the properties of markets and to derive general 
theorems about their behavior. 
The first mathematical proof-of-existence of an equilibrium (in the above sense) 
depends on some restrictive simplifying assumptions.i Among them are the following: 
 
1) The supply side of a competitive equilibrium consists of a large number 
of small independent producers (no monopolies or oligopolies); the 
demand side consists of a number of small independent consumers. None 
of the producers or consumers is able to influence prices or aggregate 
production levels. 
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2) Every commodity or service in the economy is produced from labor or 
from other commodities and services produced by the economy and sold 
in the market. By implication, no resources are taken from the environ-
ment and the environment provides no unpriced services (such as waste 
disposal). In other words, the economy is closed, and prices are 
unaffected by anything outside the market. Moreover, the closed 
economy produces only goods; there are no ‘bads’ or externalities. 
3) Each agent in the market is a perfectly rational utility maximizer. He is 
consciously aware of his own preferences and can instantaneously and 
consistently decide how he will re-allocate his income among all 
possible goods/service, given any change in market prices. 
4) Each agent in the market is perfectly informed about the prices and 
characteristics of all products and services offered for sale at all times. If 
any change were to occur (e.g. the introduction of a new product), it is 
assumed that information about it is instantaneous and automatically 
available to all agents. 
 
The most important theorems about competitive equilibrium are as follows: (1) 
all product markets, and labor markets, “clear” in the sense that supply and demand are 
perfectly balanced and (2) once an equilibrium state has been reached, no transaction 
can improve the position of one agent without hurting that of another or others. The first 
attribute — market clearing — makes the competitive equilibrium efficient: there are no 
wasted or unutilized resources, either of capital or labor. The second important attribute 
of competitive equilibrium is known as Pareto optimality. In game-theoretic terms we 
can say that, in a Pareto optimum state, all economic contests are, at best, “zero sum”, 
meaning that the sum of all gains and losses add up to zero (or less).ii 
The Pareto-optimal equilibrium state of an economy is, by definition, static. It is 
a state in which all agents in the system are as well-off as they can be, in the sense that 
no agent can improve its welfare/utility by voluntarily exchanging any goods or services 
with others. As a tool of analysis — a point of departure for theory — this concept is 
invaluable. It is, perhaps, the one area where truly rigorous analysis has been possible in 
economics, thereby differentiating economics from “softer” social sciences. 
So much for the good news. The bad news is that the economy is never actually 
in equilibrium. For example, Joan Robinson remarks “The concept of equilibrium is, of 
course, an indispensable tool of analysis … But to use the equilibrium concept, one has 
to keep it in its place, and its place is strictly in the preliminary stages of an analytical 
argument, not in the framing of hypotheses to be tested against the facts, for we know 
perfectly well that we shall not find facts in a state of equilibrium.” (Robinson 1962) p. 
78. She goes on to note that “Long run equilibrium is a slippery eel. Marshall evidently 
intended to mean by the long period a horizon which is always at a certain distance in 
the future, and this is a useful metaphor, but he slips into discussing a position of 
equilibrium which is shifted by the very process of approaching it … No one would 
deny that to speak of a tendency toward equilibrium that itself shifts the position 
towards which it is tending is a contradiction in terms …” [Ibid p.79]. 
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The only production or exchange that occurs in an equilibrium state will be 
production of services that are “consumed” as they are produced (e.g. food), or to 
replace goods that are physically used up or depreciated. In a Pareto optimum nobody 
wants to buy more than he/she buys now, if it means giving up leisure time by working 
more hours to earn more money. Nobody wants to exchange the goods he has to buy 
others at the prices offered. In short, everybody is satisfied with the status quo, by 
assumption. 
The same problem arises on the supply side. In a competitive static equilibrium 
there are no competitive advantages from scale. There can be no ‘extraordinary’ profits 
(i.e. profits  greater than required to replace depreciated capital). This is because there 
are — by assumption — no monopolies or oligopolies, so the cost of entry to any 
market is zero or negligible. Since all firms are assumed to have perfect information 
with regard to production possibilities, any firm that found an opportunity for making 
higher-than-average profits would immediately attract price-cutting competitors. 
Anyhow, no such opportunities for extraordinary profits could exist because each firm 
and sector has, by assumption, already selected the best available production technology 
for its product. In fact, competition among price-takers ensures that prices will 
inevitably fall to the marginal cost of production. Producers in a competitive 
equilibrium can expect to replace capital depreciation, but no more. Producers could 
never earn a return on equity capital sufficient to finance growth. 
Here are some other facts that are inconsistent with static equilibrium: 
 
Fact 1. Real markets do not always clear. Both backlogs and shortages 
occur from time to time. Unemployment is, of course, 
inconsistent with equilibrium in labor markets. 
Fact 2. Businesses in the real world do not price uniformly on the basis 
of cost. Enormous price differences in different countries have 
been documented (even within Europe) for brand name products, 
such as cosmetics, drugs and vitamins, where cost differences are 
irrelevant. 
Fact 3. Consumers in the real world do not insist on the lowest possible 
price, especially for domestic goods as compared to foreign 
imports. Americans once looked for the label “Made in USA” 
(which allegedly induced a Japanese exporter to locate itself in a 
town called Usa). Japanese consumers, in turn,  willingly pay two 
to ten times world prices for commodities like rice, beef and fruit, 
as long as they are produced domestically. 
Fact 4. Real firms often do not operate on or near the so-called  
technology frontier as they are assumed to do. There is ample 
evidence of this, some of which I note subsequently. (In fact, this 
is the source of many “double dividend” possibilities.) 
Fact 5. Some technologies are ‘locked in’ by a combination of market 
power and institutional barriers (such as standards), while others 
— potentially superior — can be ‘locked out’ by the same 
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mechanisms (Arthur 1994). The classic example in the literature 
is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David 1985). The British 
system of weights and measures has been locked in by the US 
and Britain, while the metric system has been locked out. Driving 
on the left (or the right) is another case in point. The most 
important example of lock-out today may be decentralized 
combined heat and power (DCHP), which has been effectively 
locked out by centralized electrical utilities with monopoly rights 
over a given territory. This case will be discussed later. 
It is important to note that in a dynamic economy the initial advantage resulting 
from returns to adoption and ‘lock in’ may not be permanent. We consider that case 
later. 
On the impossibility of growth-in-equilibrium 
For reasons summarized above, the real economy is never in equilibrium. It certainly 
follows that the idea of growth-in-equilibrium  inherently makes no sense. In a true 
equilibrium state there would be no better-than-average (or worse than average) 
investments, no growing (or declining)  sectors,  no variability of prices. The ‘quasi-
equilibrium’ theories now being explored may accommodate some structural change, 
providing it is slow and gradual. In this sense, it is only an incremental improvement 
over previous theories of growth-in-equilibrium. There is no room in the theory, 
however, for significant departures from equilibrium. There is no room in the 
conceptual scheme for hyper-inflation, “oil shocks”, stock market crashes or “bubbles”, 
not to mention wars or natural catastrophes. 
The second reason for rejecting growth-in-equilibrium models is that the 
mechanisms that drive economic growth, whether savings and investment, or 
technological innovation in pursuit of monopoly profits, are essentially non-equilibrium 
phenomena. On close examination it can be seen that the strength and effectiveness of 
these mechanisms is a function of the ‘distance’ of the system from an hypothetical  
equilibrium state. In the Pareto-optimal equilibrium state, nothing changes because all 
economic agents have already maximized their utility. They are all as well off as they 
can possibly make themselves through economic transactions. Why save and invest? 
Why innovate? The ‘rainy day’ explanation of savings is untenable: in a perfectly 
competitive market economy one simply buys insurance. Similarly, the ‘monkey 
curiosity’ explanation of scientific research and technological development is also 
untenable. 
The classical explanation of savings and investment behavioriii is that consumers 
find it optimal to forego some current consumption in order to secure a higher level of 
consumption in the future through investment and consequent income growth. The 
tradeoff between current and future consumption is the discount rate, which is 
traditionally equal to the interest rate on savings. (If the interest rate were higher than 
the discount rate, people would increase their savings; and conversely). This argument 
was fully articulated in mathematical terms long ago (Ramsey 1928). Riskier 
investments should carry higher rates of return to compensate for the risk. But the 
incentive to invest actively (as opposed to putting money in the bank) is clearly higher 
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in proportion to the difference between the expected rate of return and the bank interest 
rate. This difference is also a measure of disequilibrium, since in the postulated 
equilibrium state it would vanish. 
In an equilibrium economy there would be no investment in R&D (formalized or 
not)? Walrasian equilibrium – with or without simple human curiosity – will not 
account for Bell Telephone Laboratories. Schumpeter’s explanation (the search for 
monopoly profits) is far more plausible (Schumpeter 1912). Mansfield has provided a 
wealth of empirical data to support this hypothesis (Mansfield and et al 1977). If the 
economy were truly in Walrasian  equilibrium, either the opportunity to patent a new 
idea could not exist or — which is the same thing — it would be simultaneously 
available to all. Anyhow, monopoly profits are not possible by definition in a pure 
Walrasian model with perfect competition (no monopolistic price-makers). Thus, 
unequal distribution of intellectual property — knowledge, ideas, technology and skills 
— is another measure of disequilibrium and opportunity.iv 
The ‘quasi-equilibrium’ picture emerging from the new theory of endogenous 
growth does reflect some of the necessary motivational factors driving savings and 
investment, including the possibility of earning monopoly profits from innovation. This 
is a step forward., but not nearly a big enough one. 
To make the case that the real economy is not growing in equilibrium, nor is it 
very near equilibrium, it is simpler to point out some empirical facts about growth that 
are inconsistent with the notion of moving equilibrium: 
 
Fact 1. The structure of the economy is changing over time. Some 
sectors are declining; others are growing. To take an obvious 
example, the coal, rail and shipbuilding industries are declining. 
The semiconductor, computer,  telecom and biotechnology 
industries are growing. This kind of structural change would not 
occur on an equilibrium (homothetic) growth path. 
Fact 2. Profit opportunities vary enormously from sector to sector. A 
study of the 100 biggest firms in the world in 1912 has shown 
that the 14 petroleum firms in the sample outperformed the S&P 
500 index by a factor of 3.7 in market valuation (Hannah 1996). 
During the same period 5 electrical engineering firms 
outperformed the S&P by a factor of 2.7 (despite the laggard 
performance of Westinghouse); 10 chemical firms achieved a 
performance ratio of 2.4, and 18 ‘branded products’ firms 
managed a combined ratio of 1.3, just above average. Meanwhile 
iron & steel and heavy engineering (18 firms), mechanical 
engineering (14 firms), non-ferrous metals (10 firms), coal 
mining (7 firms) and textile and leather goods (4 firms) 
performed below average, with the last category performing at 
only 0.1 (10%) of the average level [ibid]. It is scarcely necessary 
to note that the laggard sectors were already mature in 1912, 
while the best performers were all still relatively youthful in 
terms of the product life cycle.v 
  
 
 
 10
Fact 3. Growth rates vary enormously between countries and periods. 
This should not be the case given the conditions postulated for a 
competitive equilibrium. Thus, even the “endogenous” version of 
neo-classical growth theory can scarcely hope to explain the wide 
variations between countries except in terms of degrees of failure 
to satisfy the requirements of the theory (e.g. lack of ‘openness’). 
Fact 4. If the market were in equilibrium it would have to be 
‘efficient’(in the economic sense). If the market for goods and 
services were truly efficient the market for stocks and shares 
would surely be efficient also. In this case, the market would act 
as an instantaneous information processor, such that all facts 
bearing on the price of a stock  would automatically and 
instantaneously be incorporated in its price. In this case, no 
simpler model of the stock-market (i.e. a set of investment rules, 
based on public information) could possibly perform as well as 
the market itself over a significant interval. In other words, all 
investment models would perform necessarily worse than the 
index averages. In fact, most do, but there are obvious exceptions 
such as Fidelity Magellan, and Warren Buffet’s Berkshire 
Hathaway. 
 
Given the realities, one can only conclude that markets are not particularly 
efficient, and  that firms need not necessarily operate on (or near) the efficiency frontier 
in order to survive for long periods. Indeed, economic growth is a process that is 
fundamentally dependent on disequilibrium. 
Path-dependence, ‘lock-in’ (and ‘lock-out’) 
An important aspect of the technology selection process that follows a breakthrough, in 
practice, is that one candidate configuration is selected and often ‘locked in’ before all 
(or even many) of the possible combinations has been tested. The mechanism for this is 
known as returns to adoption, which also includes static economies of scale and 
dynamic economies of learning-by-doing and accumulating experience. Economies of 
scale are well understood by every manufacturer, although their contribution to path-
dependence and ‘lock-in’ may not be so well understood. 
Learning-by-doing (which can be ‘embodied’ in the design of capital equipment 
as well as workers and organizations) is one of the dynamic mechanisms to increase 
labor productivity and cut production costs. An early, and still influential, article on this 
process appeared in the economics literature four decades ago  (Arrow 1962). Other 
noted a complementary process of ‘learning-by-using’ (Rosenberg 1982). These two 
processes, together with economies of scale in a growing economy, would seem to 
predict a smooth and moderately predictable labor productivity gains. At the macro-
level such gains are normally just assumed. But in some attempts to endogenize 
technical change, they have been attributed to ‘experience’ e.g.(Verdoorn 1951), 
(Verdoorn 1956), (Rowthorn 1975), (Rayment 1981), (McCombie 1982).vi 
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Increasing returns as a generic mechanism have been explored more recently 
(Arthur 1994). In particular, returns to adoption are much less familiar. However some 
network communications systems (notably telephones and the Internet) are fairly 
obvious examples: the more nodes in the network, the more valuable the service is to 
each subscriber. However, there are other less obvious but no less important examples. 
The more Fords are in service, the easier it will be to find spare parts and service for a 
Ford. At all events, when a new technological possibility emerges, the first two or three 
combinations that ‘work’ reasonably well tend to lock out the others. Lock-out/lock-in 
is another way of saying that once a technology has become established, it is extremely 
difficult to displace – thanks to various advantages accruing to scale, experience or 
network linkages – even if an alternative emerges that is intrinsically superior but not 
fully developed. 
Favorite examples of this phenomenon include the QWERTY keyboard (David 
1985), the English system of weights and measures, the boiling water and pressurized 
water nuclear reactors developed for the US Navy in the early 1950s (Cowan 1989), and 
the Microsoft ‘Windows’ operating system for PCs. At the aggregate national level, a 
number of studies have indicated that, if the US economic system operated on a ‘least 
cost’ basis (i.e. by assuming the most efficient solutions were utilized everywhere), 
energy consumption and carbon emissions would both be reduced by something like 
20% and costs would also be lower by a similar amount (Sant 1979; Sant and Carhart 
1981; Morris et al. 1990; Berndt, Manove, and Wood 1981; Carhart 1979; Lovins and 
Lovins 1981; Lovins et al. 1981; Lovins and Lovins 1991; Casten and Collins 2002, 
2003). In effect, the argument is that the economy has been ‘locked in’ to sub-optimal 
patterns by some combination of positive returns to scale, and inappropriate or obsolete 
regulations.vii The question arises: when (if ever) does it make sense to ‘unlock’ the 
locked-in technology? 
To be sure, many economists deny that an alternative to the existing system 
would in fact cut costs, usually by introducing the notion of ‘hidden costs’ of change 
(for instance, see (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995)). An established technology cannot be 
displaced without also displacing a host of associated technologies and investments. But 
the undeniable existence of some (hidden and unquantifiable) costs of moving from one 
local minimum to another in a multi-equilibria system does not contradict the possibility 
that another minimum may be significantly  lower than the one we currently occupy. 
What about double dividends? 
In the computable general equilibrium (CGE) and similar models, which assume 
perpetual optimality, there may be multiple optima but there is no allowance for the 
possibility of ‘phase transitions’ between optima. In simpler language there is no 
allowance for overlooked opportunities for environmental improvements or reduced 
resource (i.e. energy) consumption at negative costs, or even at a profit (the ‘double 
dividend’ or ‘free lunch’). According to standard theory, such a situation cannot arise in 
a competitive equilibrium because every agent has already exploited all possible 
opportunities for improving its welfare. This what competitive equilibrium means. 
A well-known example is the controversy over the so-called ‘Porter 
hypothesis’(Porter 1991; Porter and van der Linde 1995). Porter suggested that 
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countries that invested in environmental protection might also reap commercial 
advantage by gaining experience in efficient ‘clean’ manufacturing and exporting 
pollution treatment technologies. The hypothesis has spawned a large literature, largely 
(but not entirely) devoted to tax policy. Neoclassical economists convinced of the 
validity of the optimal choice axiom, have generally been skeptical (Goulder 1994; 
Palmer, Oates, and Portney 1995; Simpson and Bradford 1996). 
When a non-economist suggests that such possibilities do exist in reality, the 
stock rejoinder is “if such an opportunity did exist, some entrepreneur would have 
found it and exploited it”.  If an apparent opportunity is not exploited the standard 
explanation, as noted above,  is ‘hidden costs’ often within the organization (Gabel and 
Sinclair-Desgagne 1998). This satisfies most economists but few engineers or scientists. 
Be that as it may, in neo-classical economic theory the possibility of significant double 
dividends is usually assumed to be negligible. 
Examples of studies suggesting the existence of unexploited opportunities for 
high returns, indicating disequilibrium, have nevertheless been cited extensively 
(Lovins et al. 1981; Ayres 1994; von Weizsaecker, Lovins, and Lovins 1998; Lovins 
1996). One unfamiliar example but extremely convincing is worth repeating here. It 
comes from the experience of the Louisiana Division of Dow Chemical Co. in the U.S. 
In 1981 an “energy contest” was initiated, with a simple objective: to identify capital 
projects costing less than $200,000 with payback times of less than 1 year (Nelson 
1989). In its first full year (1982), 38 projects were submitted, of which 27 were 
selected for funding. Total investment was $1.7 million and the 27 projects yielded an 
average ROI of 173%. (That is, the payback time was only about 7 months). Since 
1982, the contest has continued, with an increased number of projects funded each year. 
The ROI cutoff was reduced year-by year to 30% in 1987, and the maximum capital 
investment was gradually increased. For 1993 140 projects were funded for $9.1 
million. Table I below summarizes the results of the Dow experience. 
It is interesting to note that, although the number of funded projects increased 
each year, there was (through 1993) no evidence of saturation. Numerous profitable 
opportunities for saving energy, with payback times well below one year, still existed 
even after the program had been in existence for 12 years. Almost unbelievably, the 
average ROI of the funded projects did not decrease, as it would have done if the first 
projects had been exceptional examples of ‘low hanging fruit’. On the contrary, the 
average ROI  increased. For the years 1991 and 1992 the ROIs were 309% and 305%, 
with a slight decline to 298% in 1993. Over the 12 years since the contest began, the 
average post-audit ROI on 575 audited projects was 204% and total audited savings are 
over $100 million per year. 
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Table I: Summary of Dow Energy Contest Results – All Projects 
 
 
 
198
2 
 
198
3 
 
198
4
 
1985
 
198
6
 
1987
 
1988
 
1989
 
1990
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993
 
Winning 
Projects 
Capital, $MM 
Average ROI 
(%) 
ROI Cut-Off 
(%) 
 
Savings, 
$M/yr 
   Fuel Gas(a) 
   Capacity 
   Maintenance 
   
Miscellaneous 
 
27 
1.7 
173 
100 
 
 
297
0 
83 
10 
 
 
32 
2.2 
340 
100 
 
 
765
0 
-63 
45 
 
 
38
4.0
208
100
690
3
150
6
-59
 
59
7.1
124
50
7533
2498
187
 
60
7.1
106
40
713
6
798
357
 
90
10.6
97
30
5530
3747
2206
  19
 
94
9.3
182
30
4171
1336
8
583
 -98
 
64
7.5
470
30
3050
3273
5
1121
154
 
115
13.1
122
30
5113
8656
1675
2130
 
108 
8.6 
309 
30 
 
 
2109 
1790
9 
2358 
5270 
 
109 
6.4 
305 
50 
 
 
5167 
1164
5 
2947 
518 
 
140
9.1
298
50
4586
2031
1
2756
788
 
Total Savings 
 
306
3 
 
763
2 
 
835
0
 
1021
8
 
829
1
 
1150
2
 
1802
4
 
3706
0
 
1757
5
 
2764
7 
 
2027
7 
 
2844
0
 
Source: (Nelson 1993): Tables 4 and 6 
 
On the average, all energy contest projects have paid for themselves in 6 
months, with a drop to 4 months in the last 3 years! One would have to suspect that the 
program could still be expanded many-fold before returns fell to the 30% ROI 
threshold. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that these opportunities existed 
even in a sophisticated and cost conscious firm at relatively low U.S. energy prices. 
Should taxes or a new energy crisis force U.S. prices higher (i.e. toward world levels), 
the number of such opportunities would almost certainly be multiplied further. 
Total savings over the twelve years of the contest have not been published but 
must surely be of the order of 1 billion dollars. This was money that went directly to 
profits: i.e. the bottom line.  It undoubtedly added billions to the market value of Dow 
stock, and the CEO’s bonus. Sad to report, the initiator and ‘champion’ of the contest, 
Mr. Kenneth Nelson, received no reward whatsoever for his efforts on behalf of the 
company. He left the firm in 1994.  He was not promoted to high rank. He was never 
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given significant recognition for his outstanding services.  Senior officials in other parts 
of the company did not even know of his accomplishments.viii As far as I am aware, no 
other division of Dow has attempted to duplicate Nelson’s accomplishment, nor has it 
been imitated elsewhere. 
The Dow case has strong implications for fundamental economic assumptions 
about firms. The standard theory assumes that firms operate on or very near the so-
called efficiency ‘frontier’. Obviously Dow did not, and does not. Yet Dow is obviously 
successful (indeed, it is greatly admired in some quarters) and it is certainly 
competitive, by most measures. How can this be? 
I do not have inside knowledge as to why Dow (and its competitors) did not 
follow up on Nelson’s profitable (but radical) idea. I can only guess. But, for whatever 
it is worth, I guess that one of the reasons was, basically, that Nelson’s operation could 
not succeed without Nelson himself, or someone like him, who was prepared to risk his 
career on an idea. Success required, among other things, the empowerment of low-level 
engineers to make capital allocation decisions, thus reducing the authority of higher 
level managers. This creates a conflict of interest, since company culture is invariably 
focused on growth. There are rewards to managers for growing. There are no rewards, 
at the lower levels of the management hierarchy at least, for finding savings in existing 
operations, except by means of layoffs. There is no penalty for not finding savings 
(unless the company is in dire straits). There are serious penalties for failure, however. 
Careers die on the vine. Indeed, even success can be dangerous: any executive who 
suddenly discovers a way to save a lot of money from existing operations is sure to 
embarrass the executives who preceded him in the job. One of those preceding 
executives is very likely to be the boss (or a higher level boss). It does not pay to 
embarrass the boss. 
Received neo-classical economic theory offers no convincing explanation for the 
Dow  example, or others that have been cited. As already mentioned, mainstream 
theorists tend to insist that such possibilities are really exceptional. My own explanation 
is simpler: the mature industries are all oligopolies. Oligopolies resist change. Risk-
taking is strongly discouraged in large firms. Successful innovation is not consistently 
rewarded. Credit for successful innovation is routinely claimed by hierarchical 
superiors. But failure is likely to be punished by career derailment, if not worse. 
Oligopolies make a show of competing, but they are not really structured to compete 
effectively. 
In short, the idea of competitive equilibrium is seductive, but it does not describe 
the real world. CGE models, which depend on the idea of growth-in-equilibrium have 
very little predictive power. There are some questions for which such models can 
provide useful insights, for instance proposed changes in tax policy. But the problem of 
predicting long-range economic growth — especially with exogenous technological 
change — is certainly not one of them. There is also no room in the equilibrium picture 
for radical innovation, “free lunches”, or “double dividends” whereby a firm can reduce 
effluent emissions and environmental damage by cutting waste and reducing inputs, 
while at the same time making bigger profits than before. These possibilities are simply 
assumed away by the model structure, although they unquestionably do exist. 
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The case cited above exemplifies the existence of unexploited opportunities, 
even in competitive firms. A far more important example is discussed below; 
The DCHP case 
Perhaps the most important example of a double – actually triple – dividend that has 
evidently been ‘locked out’ is the low rate of utilization of decentralized co-generation 
or decentralized combined heat and power (DCHP). In simple words, the idea 
encompasses two approaches. The first is to utilize low temperature heat from steam-
electric power generators, that would normally be dissipated in air or cooling water, for 
residential or commercial space heating or water heating. This displaces boiler fuel that 
would otherwise be used. The second approach is to utilize high temperature waste heat 
or pressure from petroleum refineries, blast furnaces and the like to generate electric 
power that can be utilized on the same site or nearby. 
The logic of using otherwise wasted low temperature heat from power 
generation to replace boiler fuel for heating is overwhelming. Figure 1 illustrates the 
benefits schematically: to produce 35 units of electric power and 50 units of heat via 
CHP (co-generation) requires of the order of 100 units of fuel exergy, as compared to 
189 units if the electricity and heat are provided separately. The overall losses in this 
example are reduced from 104 units to only 15 units, an enormous gain. Fuel inputs are 
reduced by 89 units out of 189, nearly a factor of two. The first strategy has been widely 
adopted, mainly in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, as ‘district heating’. In 
many cities steam from centralized coal-burning power plants is piped to nearby 
residential areas (mostly apartment blocks) for domestic heating purposes. 
Unfortunately, even though the pipes are insulated, there are significant losses along the 
way and it is difficult to regulate the temperature at the end of the pipe, resulting in 
further inefficiencies, especially in the older East Europe applications. Also, the 
diversion of steam at a temperature above 100 deg. C. also reduces the efficiency of the 
electric power generating unit by several percentage points. District heating has not 
been widely adopted in the West for these reasons. 
The theoretical gains illustrated in the illustration are not quite as easily 
achieved in practice as one might hope. There are multiple reasons, but the basic one is 
that the electric utility industry in most countries is a regulated ‘natural’ monopoly 
created to sell electricity, and not heat, under the (false) assumption that centralized 
power generation is more efficient than decentralized power generation. This was 
clearly true early in the twentieth century, but is no longer necessarily true. Relatively 
small gas turbines and Diesel engines are nearly as efficient as large steam generating 
systems, especially when transmission and distribution losses are taken into account. 
The next generation of high temperature fuel cells may be even more efficient. I 
comment further on these points below. 
As regards the second strategy, it starts from the fact that many industrial 
processes produce under-utilized by-product energy streams. These include (1) hot 
exhaust gases, (2) combustible flare gases and (3) high pressure gases. Hot exhaust 
gases are produced by coke ovens, pelletizing ovens, glass furnaces, petroleum 
refineries, ammonia plants or hot rolled steel ovens. Flare gases are mainly produced by 
blast furnaces or petroleum refineries. High pressure gases are mainly from steam or 
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natural gas pipelines, which must be reduced to ambient or near ambient pressure at the 
point of use. All of these can be used to generate electricity using commercially 
available equipment. Nevertheless, virtually all industrial facilities also utilize electric 
power, entirely purchased from the grid. The problem is to utilize the in-house waste 
energy streams to save on purchased electricity. Unfortunately, the electric utilities set 
discouragingly high prices on grid inter-connections and they pay low prices for 
purchased surplus power, mainly to discourage such competition. 
Four examples follow: 
Example #1. So-called ‘blast furnace gas’ at the US Steel works in Gary Indiana, 
consisting mostly of carbon monoxide and nitrogen, with some hydrogen and some 
carbon dioxide is a by-product of the iron smelting process. The monoxide and 
hydrogen make the gas flammable (and toxic), so it would have to be flared unless a 
beneficial use could be found. However at the US Steel works the gas has been captured 
to produce steam to power a steam turbine generator within the plant boundaries, with 
average electricity production of nearly 100 megawatts (MWe). The generating plant 
also extracts low pressure steam for process use throughout the mill and displaces boiler 
fuel.  The mill saves nearly $20 million per year, after full capital recovery, and 
simultaneously avoids the use of 1.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per year, together 
with the carbon dioxide (and other pollutants) that would otherwise have been emitted.. 
Example #2. Exhaust gas from 268 coke ovens at Cokenergy in Northern 
Indiana has been directed to 16 heat recovery steam generators to produce 90 MWe of 
power and 1.3 million pounds of steam for the adjacent Inland-Ispat steel complex.  
This energy recycling process saves $58 million per year, after full capital recovery, and 
avoids 4.3 million barrels of oil equivalent as well as the associated pollution. 
Example #3. Kodak’s main complex in Rochester New York stretches 5 miles 
end to end. It is now served by a multi-pressure steam system for the chemical 
processes on site. A steam extraction system has been built that recycles over 3 million 
pounds of steam per hour and generates roughly 150 MWe  also used within the plant. 
The system saves nearly $80 million per year after full capital recovery and avoids 3.6 
million barrels of oil equivalent per year. 
Example #4. An Equistar plant in Illinois produces alcohol from natural gas 
feedstock with steam from a coal fired boiler.  A back pressure steam turbine now 
recycles the high grade energy in the steam pressure to produce 16 MWe, saving $3.5 
million per year after full capital recovery and avoiding roughly 100,000 barrels of oil 
equivalent per year. 
These four examples illustrate the magnitude of possible reductions in the cost 
of energy possible from recycling the heat energy that is wasted unnecessarily by the 
arbitrary separation of electricity generation and process heat.  In every case, these 
direct savings to the firm that invests in co-generation are only part of the story. Equally 
important are capital savings from avoided T&D investment, avoided transmission 
losses due to the lightened remaining load on local and regional wires, increased 
reliability of the grid (due to greater diversity of generators) and avoided emissions 
from boilers no longer needed to provide industrial steam or domestic/commercial space 
heating or hot water. 
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Official reports of the Energy Information Agency (EIA) show that only 9% of 
the total electric power generated in the US in 2000 was produced by facilities that 
recycled waste heat, even though many of them may have operated at a sub-optimal 
level in terms of the power-to-heat ratio.  As of 2002 the Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) reported 806 combined heat and power plants in the US with 78 gigawatts (GWe) 
of “nameplate capacity” This was 7.13% of total installed capacity in the US.ix 
However, the potential is much greater.  A recent study has identified 44 gigawatts 
(GWe) of additional  capacity that could be powered with waste heat from just three 
source categories:  flare gas from petrochemical processes, exhaust heat from the gas 
turbines that drive transcontinental gas pipeline compressors, and the utilization of 
steam pressure drop in industrial steam systems, as in the   Kodak example (Casten and 
Collins 2002, 2003). That study omitted other industrial energy streams.  Another recent 
study done for EPA has estimated that 95.7 gigawatts (GWe) of electric power could be 
provided in the US by recycled industrial waste heat in 19 industries. This would 
amount to 11.5% of current generating  capacity in the US. 
Yet, according to the 2003 Energy Information Agency (EIA) data, only 2.5 
GWe of co-generation capacity was actually installed. Exploiting the full existing 
potential would save the US economy $4 to $10 billion per year after full capital cost 
recovery and avoid 200 to 500 million barrels of oil equivalent per year, not to mention 
the sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide associated with the combustion of 
those fossil fuels. Even greater opportunities will arise in the coming years. The 
electrical supply industry has forecast that the US will need 137 GW of new capacity by 
2010, costing $84 billion, plus $220 billion for additional transmission and distribution 
(T&D). Casten estimates that meeting this demand with decentralized CHP would cost 
only $168 billion, with no additional needs for transmission and distribution (Table IV). 
This translates into a saving of $.03/kWh. 
There is a great disparity between states with power produced by CHP, ranging 
from 0% in three states to 22% in California and 25% in Hawaii. Of course the 
discrepancies are partly attributable to the mix of power production facilities, since 
hydroelectric plants are incompatible with CHP, and nuclear plants – as in France – are 
usually sited too far from cities to be able to provide district heating economically.  
International data show that combined heat and power (CHP) facilities generate roughly 
7.2 % of the world’s electric power, similar to the US percentage. But, according to 
national statistics, CHP accounts for over 50% of the electric power generated in 
Denmark, 39% in the Netherlands, 37% in Finland and 31% in Russia; Germany gets 
19% and Poland, Japan, and China are at 18%. (Admittedly the high cogeneration 
(CHP) percentages in Russia, Poland, former E. Germany and China reflect long-
standing policies of encouraging district heating combined with coal-burning central 
power plants.) These data indicate that CHP can be installed, provided the policies are 
friendly, that the plants are significant in size and burn all fuels, and that it is possible to 
recycle heat energy from a majority of electric generation facilities. 
Misinformed opinion 
A fundamental problem blocking reform is that policy-makers, regulators and the public 
assume that central generation is optimal. This was true early in the 20th century but is 
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true no longer.  Several unquestioned but incorrect assumptions underlie this fallacy. 
They include the following: 
False assumption: Economies of scale guarantee that central power generation 
is more cost effective. Correction. It is still true that a new large  plant can be built for 
fewer dollars per kilowatt of generating capacity ($500 to $1500) than a smaller plant 
using the same fuels and technology. However, this statement applies only to capital 
cost for the plant itself, not the fuel and not transmission and distribution (T&D), hence 
not the cost of power delivered to the user.  There are several reasons. First, existing  
transmission system capacity in the US (and almost everywhere else)  is overloaded . 
Adding a new central plant is not sufficient: transmission and distribution (T&D) 
capacity must also be increased to accommodate it. But, according to an Arthur D. Little 
study in 1999 each new kilowatt of central capacity requires an average of $1380 for 
new T&D wires. This increases the investment to $1880-$2880 per kW. 
Moreover, average line losses from central power are 9% in the US. But the 
losses under conditions of peak demand are closer to 25%.  This means that to supply a 
kilowatt of new peak load from a central plant to distant consumers, at times of peak 
load, one must construct 1.33 kilowatts of new generation and transmission capacity. 
This drives the investment up to between $2500 and $3840 per kW. In addition, central 
generation requires at least 15% reserve margin on top of expected peak loads. The cost 
of this reserve capacity ranges from $360 to $525. It follows that to add 1 kW of new 
capacity at a central plant one must actually build 1.56 kW of new central capacity and 
T&D at a total cost between $2875 and $4375, before paying for any fuel. In short, the 
real capital investment of new central capacity will be over 5.5 times the supposed 
minimum of $500/kW, and nearly 3 times the supposed maximum of $1500/kW. 
Now consider a decentralized plant across the street from a customer. There is 
no need to add T&D capacity and there are virtually no line losses, because power is 
consumed either by, or virtually next door to, the producer. The new decentralized plant 
will replace the last leg of the distribution system, so it may require the addition of $100 
to $200 per kW for wires, far less than the capital needed for adding the same capacity 
to a central system. These savings are additional to the fuel saving that arises from the 
fact that the decentralized plant saves boiler fuel that would otherwise be needed to 
provide heat to the customer. The World Alliance for Decentralized Energy (WADE) 
has built a model to take account of all of these factors to determine the optimal way to 
provide for expected electric load growth. The results from a number of model runs 
indicate that  meeting all anticipated US load growth with decentralized generation 
would save $350 billion over the next two decades. This represents a reduction of 40% 
from the likely cost of meeting the demand from central generation alone. 
The bar charts that follow (Figure 2) show recent estimates of energy savings, 
emissions reductions, capital savings and retail price savings for various assumptions 
about the use of decentralized CHP. 
 
False argument: modern large combined cycle centralized plants (utilizing gas turbines 
and steam turbines in combination) can achieve up to 55% thermodynamic efficiency at 
significantly lower costs per kW, whereas smaller units in DCHP applications are 
significantly less efficient, and more polluting (Gulli). Correction. When the other 
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advantages of CHP are considered, especially the additional T&D and reserve capacity 
requirements, the cost advantages of central plants are illusory. While it is true that most 
CHP applications require gaseous fuel, the same is true of the cited combined cycle 
plants, of which there are very few, whereas most electric power in the US is generated 
by aging coal-fired plants. Moreover, much of the domestic and commercial boiler fuel 
that would be replaced by DCHP is, in fact,  natural gas. In other words, DCHP would 
help relieve the increasingly tight natural gas supply. 
 
False argument: DCHP plants could fail at the same time the grid is experiencing 
peak loads, so the grid must enough additional redundant capacity to meet this 
demand. This is the argument regularly made by monopoly utilities to justify high 
standby rates. Correction. This argument applies only in the hypothetical case that 
there is one local generation plant on the entire utility grid, and that plant has only one 
generator.  Since there are already 800 large distributed generation plants operating in 
the US, or an average of 40 per state, this hypothetical case is academic.  Most DG 
plants have 2 to 8 generators that have random failure rates of between 2% and 4%.  A 
grid with 100 DG plants connected thus has a probable failure rate of 2% to 4% of the 
DG capacity at any one time, including the system peak time.  And, with a significant 
amount of DG capacity connected to a grid, system reliability can be achieved with less 
than the 15% to 20% redundancy needed by a grid served by only a few large central 
plants. 
A recent study by the Carnegie Mellon Center for Electric Industry Analysis 
shows  that a system based on many decentralized generation units located near users 
can achieve desired reliability with only 4% to 5% reserve margin, rather than the 
standard 15% reserve margin required by central plants (Zerriffi 2004). Putting it 
another way, depending on the percentage of power generated locally, the need for 
dedicated reserve capacity from the grid could range from 0% to 4%. The study cited 
above concluded “Even without considering the benefits of robustness...a DG system 
offers substantial cost savings. Based on current IC engine cogeneration, and with 
utilization of only half of the cogeneration capabilities of IC engines, savings of up to 
20% can be realized in the cost of electricity....These savings increase if more 
cogeneration is used (ibid. p.129)”Other studies have led to similar conclusions (Lovins 
and Datta 2002; A. D. Little Inc. 2000). 
The key to opening this reservoir of opportunities is deregulation of the electric 
power industry, especially by eliminating as many as possible of the barriers to 
competition listed in the text (Morgan and Zerriffi 2002; King and Morgan 2003). It 
should be emphasized that there is no need to eliminate conventional centralized 
capacity. The DCHP suppliers will have plenty to do in just meeting the demand 
increases already forecast for the next 20 years. Nor is there any reason to weep for the 
established utilities. Once the deregulation has occurred there is nothing to prevent them 
from getting into the DCHP business themselves. The end result will be a sharp increase 
in the overall efficiency of the US power system, and that of many other countries, with 
lower costs to consumers and less pollution of the environment. 
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Conclusions 
Double dividends can and do exist in the modern world. The assumption that the 
economic system is always in equilibrium and that all technical subsystems are optimal 
is not only wrong but extremely dangerous, because it interferes with rational policy-
making. The truth is that opportunities for savings can be found in many places. One 
major obstacle to finding them is inertia, or the assumption that there is nothing to find. 
Another obstacle is obsolete regulation from an earlier era. 
On a more specific level, a very significant increase in the efficiency of fossil 
fuel use, with consequent reductions in GHG emissions and increases in system 
reliability, as well as reductions in consumer costs, can be had by the simple device of 
deregulating the US electric power distribution system. This would encourage many 
small producers to produce electric power and heat for local use while simultaneously 
remaining attached to the grid and providing reserve capacity for the grid. 
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Endnotes 
 
i. The existence of a static general equilibrium in such a system was finally proved in the 1930's by 
Abraham Wald for some special cases. More general proofs were given in 1954 by Kenneth 
Arrow and Gerard Debreu  and by McKenzie (Arrow and Debreu 1954; McKenzie 1954) This 
achievement has steered a generation of economists into the analysis of highly abstract 
mathematical models. Actually, the rather tight restrictions of the original Walras model have 
been significantly loosened. The general equilibrium has even been extended to the dynamic 
case, with exhaustible resources (e.g. (Solow 1974), subject as before to the assumption of 
perfect futures markets for resources. A great deal of theoretical superstructure has been added 
on to this basic model in recent years, e.g. (Dasgupta and Heal 1979). 
ii. Game theory, along with the modern form of utility theory, were introduced to economics by 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). 
iii. Actually it is not clear that savings and investment should be equated. Savings are not always 
invested productively. Egyptian pharaohs built pyramids. Medieval towns built cathedrals. 
Keynes told the story of the poet Alexander Pope's father, who retired from business to a 
Twickenham villa with a "chest full of guineas" from which he met household expenses 
thereafter (Keynes 1936) p. 221. French peasants are notorious for keeping their savings as gold 
coins, hidden under the mattress, while Indian women traditionally keep their dowries in the 
form of gold bracelets and other jewelry. Many modern millionaires collect old masters, large 
yachts and other symbols of wealth.  Modern nations build strategic nuclear forces. None of 
these activities can be regarded as productive investment in any meaningful sense, however 
much pyramids, cathedrals and old masters created hundreds of years ago may have 
inadvertently added to the quality of life for people alive today. Surely investment in productive 
enterprise, or in R&D, must be explained otherwise — presumably in terms of expectations of 
future’supernormal’ profits. 
 
iv. However, it has been shown that the condition of perfect competition can be relaxed without 
losing the possibility of competitive equilibrium; e.g. (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Ethier 1982; 
Grossman and Helpman 1989; Judd 1985). One cause of imperfect competition is, incidentally, 
increasing returns to scale of production (at the firm level). So, the co-existence of imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale do not ipso facto guarantee that the economy is not in 
equilibrium.  
v. The technology life cycle is an important feature of the landscape. It is widely accepted as a 
useful metaphor of the pattern of technological change. The basic idea of an aging process goes 
back to "Wolff’s Law" of increasing marginal cost of improvement and Kuznets’ work on 
industrial succession and the business cycle (Kuznets 1930). It has been rediscovered and 
reformulated many times, especially by (Nelson 1962; Vernon 1966; Abernathy and Utterback 
1975). Also see (Ayres 1988, 1994), Chapter 6. 
vi. The economic literature is comprehensively reviewed in (Argote and Epple 1990). For a more 
technological approach, see (Ayres and Martinás 1992). 
vii.   The theory of `lock in’ (also known as `path dependence’) has been developed mainly by Brian 
Arthur (Arthur 1983, 1988). 
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viii. I can testify to this on the basis of personal conversations with senior Dow officials. I also wrote 
a letter to the CEO of Dow asking why Nelson had been treated so shabbily. I got a brush-off 
from a flunky. 
ix. These CHP plants averaged 84 megawatts each. (The data do not include plants with less than 1 
megawatt of capacity, so many micro-turbines and small diesel plants are not included.) By 
contrast, in the U.S. there were 3855 utility-owned or municipal electricity-only power plants 
with nameplate capacity of 863 gigawatts, averaging 224 megawatts per plant.  
